Monday, June 18, 2012
Is SMS Working For Your Orgnaization?
Sunday, February 26, 2012
GoAround when Cleared for Visual Approach
This is a big ATC issue in the US, especially at airports with heavy traffic.
A flight cleared for a visual approach requires so much less attention and separation than does a flight cleared for an instrument approach. International pilots flying into the US from abroad need to be aware of this differentiation in ATC procedures from what they may be accustomed to, in order that they are prepared to execute the correct GA procedure, all depending on the most recent clearance from approach control. While flying internationally, it was my experience that ATC and (or ATS) seldom if ever changed the approach clearance from an instrument to a visual, even after the crew reported "Runway IN SIGHT". Most often Approach Control just acknowledged the call and switched the flight to tower. But the flight clearance was still the same instrument clearance, and therefore MAP clearance was still valid. But most often this is not so in the US.
It is a very important training goal for non-US airlines to familiarize their international crew members flying into the US to be aware of the clearance changeover by approach control, from an instrument approach to a visual approach and all that goes along with that clearance changeover, most especially being the ATC expectations for flight crew actions in the event they get a tower directed GA after being cleared for the visual approach.
ATC does not expect that the crew will fly the MAP as published, but rather will stay with tower for either a visual integration into a VFR downwind pattern or a handover back to approach control for radar vectors back into the instrument patterns to return the flight back to final. If the crew just begins to fly the MAP without clearance, there may very well be separation issues, since the airspace for the MAP may not have been protected ahead of time. This again is the consequence of Approach Control changing the clearance to a visual approach.
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Airlines Lobbying usurp Citizens Rights of Pilots in Latest FAA Ruling
Cargo Carriers Lawyers and the Power of Dollars Overcomes Cargo Pilots Safety Rights of One Man One Vote.
Fatigue, the greatest Human Factors problem in commercial aviation, was introduced back into the recipe of severe hazards by the work of lobbying lawyers working for the US cargo carrier industry. US Transportation officials chose to succumb to the political pressure and apparently to the financial power of lobbyists who argued that commercial cargo carriers would be subject to undue financial pressures if the cargo airlines were required to operate safely.
Instead, it appears to me that these company lawyers argued to the FAA lawyers that there is not case law that cites fatigue as causing cargo crashes that impact the public. In my opinion, no one at the FAA acts as a safety manager or safety regulator or safety administrator but rather act as lawyers and consider events related to flight operations only from the point of view of what has happened in the past. But the FEDEX B727 Tallahassee, FL fatigue related crash did not take out a neighborhood and therefore didn’t affect the public, so it appears that to an FAA lawyer only administrator, this and other similar fatigue related cargo carrier mishaps do not affect their judgment of their ability to think legally.
Did the FAA lawyers or the cargo industry lawyers look at the huge casualty costs of operating under the federal regulations as they have existed and now exist?
If, as I believe, the lawyers were trained as safety regulators, they would see the risk that fatigued cargo pilots could crash into a city such as San Diego, Philadelphia, Newark, Louisville or any number of cities overflown by cargo pilots at 5-6am at the end of a fatiguing 16 hour day of 8 or more hours of flight time.
In my opinion, the FAA is not protecting the rights of citizen pilots flying for cargo carriers. It appears to me that the FAA, the US Federal Government, is not protecting the rights of citizens living under the flight path of cargo flights arriving at 5-6am in major city hub airports. Instead, it appears to me that elected and appointed US officials are choosing to give corporation lobbying lawyers better rights than individual US citizens, so that the corporations can make more money, while the safety of the public is not protected.
The FAA Safety Policy is “One Level of Safety.” However, it appears that the FAA has dragged out some old past century bureaucrats to recreate government of the dollar, by the dollar and for the dollar, instead of “of the people, by the people and for the people,” as noted by US President Abraham Lincoln in his famous Gettysburg Address.
It is my opinion the old style bureaucrats, who have so totally screwed up the management of safety in domestic commercial aviation for so many years, should instead leave aviation safety management to people who are experienced and by this degree qualified to make decisions of regulation.
The best example is to look at the terrible mess that the FAA’s regulations have had on the US commercial airline industry. I believe that it took more than 20 years of failed regulations to institute effective wind-shear, fatigue, baggage management and TCAS standards. Now it appears that they are involved in another 20-year struggle to handle effective crew training and human factors fatigue standards.
But then we should look at all of the lives lost in the air and on the ground, the airplanes destroyed, the property destroyed year after year for the past 40 years in US domestic airline disasters? The data shows thousands of lives lost, billions of dollars destroyed, all under commercial airline operations certified and regulated by the FAA.
In my opinion it is now time that the FAA should be led by someone from the airline industry, someone who actually has some experience and therefore credentials as a successful aviation safety manager? Can the US really afford to re-create two levels of safety in commercial aviation? Was not that FAA policy already discredited years ago?
So, can anyone tell me if lawyers really study any aviation safety policy, theory or philosophy in law school? If so, I sure would like to see the law school syllabus reference, because I sure have not been able to find one.
I believe it is time for new leadership in aviation safety in America.
Fatigue, the greatest Human Factors problem in commercial aviation, was introduced back into the recipe of severe hazards by the work of lobbying lawyers working for the US cargo carrier industry. US Transportation officials chose to succumb to the political pressure and apparently to the financial power of lobbyists who argued that commercial cargo carriers would be subject to undue financial pressures if the cargo airlines were required to operate safely.
Instead, it appears to me that these company lawyers argued to the FAA lawyers that there is not case law that cites fatigue as causing cargo crashes that impact the public. In my opinion, no one at the FAA acts as a safety manager or safety regulator or safety administrator but rather act as lawyers and consider events related to flight operations only from the point of view of what has happened in the past. But the FEDEX B727 Tallahassee, FL fatigue related crash did not take out a neighborhood and therefore didn’t affect the public, so it appears that to an FAA lawyer only administrator, this and other similar fatigue related cargo carrier mishaps do not affect their judgment of their ability to think legally.
Did the FAA lawyers or the cargo industry lawyers look at the huge casualty costs of operating under the federal regulations as they have existed and now exist?
If, as I believe, the lawyers were trained as safety regulators, they would see the risk that fatigued cargo pilots could crash into a city such as San Diego, Philadelphia, Newark, Louisville or any number of cities overflown by cargo pilots at 5-6am at the end of a fatiguing 16 hour day of 8 or more hours of flight time.
In my opinion, the FAA is not protecting the rights of citizen pilots flying for cargo carriers. It appears to me that the FAA, the US Federal Government, is not protecting the rights of citizens living under the flight path of cargo flights arriving at 5-6am in major city hub airports. Instead, it appears to me that elected and appointed US officials are choosing to give corporation lobbying lawyers better rights than individual US citizens, so that the corporations can make more money, while the safety of the public is not protected.
The FAA Safety Policy is “One Level of Safety.” However, it appears that the FAA has dragged out some old past century bureaucrats to recreate government of the dollar, by the dollar and for the dollar, instead of “of the people, by the people and for the people,” as noted by US President Abraham Lincoln in his famous Gettysburg Address.
It is my opinion the old style bureaucrats, who have so totally screwed up the management of safety in domestic commercial aviation for so many years, should instead leave aviation safety management to people who are experienced and by this degree qualified to make decisions of regulation.
The best example is to look at the terrible mess that the FAA’s regulations have had on the US commercial airline industry. I believe that it took more than 20 years of failed regulations to institute effective wind-shear, fatigue, baggage management and TCAS standards. Now it appears that they are involved in another 20-year struggle to handle effective crew training and human factors fatigue standards.
But then we should look at all of the lives lost in the air and on the ground, the airplanes destroyed, the property destroyed year after year for the past 40 years in US domestic airline disasters? The data shows thousands of lives lost, billions of dollars destroyed, all under commercial airline operations certified and regulated by the FAA.
In my opinion it is now time that the FAA should be led by someone from the airline industry, someone who actually has some experience and therefore credentials as a successful aviation safety manager? Can the US really afford to re-create two levels of safety in commercial aviation? Was not that FAA policy already discredited years ago?
So, can anyone tell me if lawyers really study any aviation safety policy, theory or philosophy in law school? If so, I sure would like to see the law school syllabus reference, because I sure have not been able to find one.
I believe it is time for new leadership in aviation safety in America.
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Practice, Procedure, Policy, Technique, Philosophy: What really is "BEST?"
This is one of the basics. Knowing these relationships helps us understand how to do alot of other things correctly. Back to basics is always valuable.
I will challenge my readers to put them in a logical order:
Practice, Procedure, Policy, Technique, Philosophy: What is the right order?
Then read my letter below.
Dear All my Friends:
With respect to the term "best practices," I would like to make a comment. What we are really fostering here is better labeled "Best Procedures." To clarify, procedures are documents, they are published, they are written down and promulgated by an authoritative source such as a company or a regulatory agency, they are dated, they are signed, they can be and almost always are formally modified, updated and changed through a formal process.
As safety advocates for Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), it is my opinion that we should be fostering Best Procedures.
The term practice most often denotes the work of an instructor in teaching students how to carry out a procedure, which the practitioner then uses as a tool for conducting the Standard Operating Procedures correctly, consistently and safely.
The follow-on term is technique. Technique is the individual styles that operators and practitioners employ to make the practice smooth, tailored to the operation and refined.
Best Procedures is what we, I believe, should be advocating. Leave the techniques and practices to the individuals who are the technicians and practitioners.
As FSF, should we not be about influencing commercial companies and regulatory agencies to set up new authoritative written and published formal methods of operating? Is not our real customer, if you will, is not our real customer each company and regulatory agency? Are not these the parties that we are really trying to address and influence?
Can we expect to address all commercial pilots (70,000 just in the US) with a suggestion on how to adjust their practices? Remember that PRACTICES ARE NOT WRITTEN DOWN. But Procedures are. So this is the difference.
And the use of the word protocol is even more problematic, because we really do not know the authority of the protocol writer?
I would encourage us and the rest of the commercial airline industry to consider using the term BEST PROCEDURES from now on and leave the practices to the practitioners.
The right order is: The ordered ideas of our own innovations become our philosophy. Our leadership transforms our philosophy into our policy. Our need for standardized action transforms policy into procedures. Operational reality creates practicality for our actions and our human factors translates practice into individual techniques.
So for my readers the correct order is: philosophy, policy, procedures, practice and technique. Any or all of them may be fostered as "best." That is the right of global free speech.
But in fostering Safety, it is my recommendation that we use the taxonomy BEST PROCEDURES. This denotes standardization, authority and actions based on research, science and accountability. The excellent safety records of organizations that adhere to this order may give you motive to agree.
Best regards, Paul Miller
I will challenge my readers to put them in a logical order:
Practice, Procedure, Policy, Technique, Philosophy: What is the right order?
Then read my letter below.
Dear All my Friends:
With respect to the term "best practices," I would like to make a comment. What we are really fostering here is better labeled "Best Procedures." To clarify, procedures are documents, they are published, they are written down and promulgated by an authoritative source such as a company or a regulatory agency, they are dated, they are signed, they can be and almost always are formally modified, updated and changed through a formal process.
As safety advocates for Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), it is my opinion that we should be fostering Best Procedures.
The term practice most often denotes the work of an instructor in teaching students how to carry out a procedure, which the practitioner then uses as a tool for conducting the Standard Operating Procedures correctly, consistently and safely.
The follow-on term is technique. Technique is the individual styles that operators and practitioners employ to make the practice smooth, tailored to the operation and refined.
Best Procedures is what we, I believe, should be advocating. Leave the techniques and practices to the individuals who are the technicians and practitioners.
As FSF, should we not be about influencing commercial companies and regulatory agencies to set up new authoritative written and published formal methods of operating? Is not our real customer, if you will, is not our real customer each company and regulatory agency? Are not these the parties that we are really trying to address and influence?
Can we expect to address all commercial pilots (70,000 just in the US) with a suggestion on how to adjust their practices? Remember that PRACTICES ARE NOT WRITTEN DOWN. But Procedures are. So this is the difference.
And the use of the word protocol is even more problematic, because we really do not know the authority of the protocol writer?
I would encourage us and the rest of the commercial airline industry to consider using the term BEST PROCEDURES from now on and leave the practices to the practitioners.
The right order is: The ordered ideas of our own innovations become our philosophy. Our leadership transforms our philosophy into our policy. Our need for standardized action transforms policy into procedures. Operational reality creates practicality for our actions and our human factors translates practice into individual techniques.
So for my readers the correct order is: philosophy, policy, procedures, practice and technique. Any or all of them may be fostered as "best." That is the right of global free speech.
But in fostering Safety, it is my recommendation that we use the taxonomy BEST PROCEDURES. This denotes standardization, authority and actions based on research, science and accountability. The excellent safety records of organizations that adhere to this order may give you motive to agree.
Best regards, Paul Miller
Monday, December 12, 2011
"BEST PROCEDURES" vs Best Practices: which is the More Correct Taxonomy??
With respect to the term "best practices," I would like to make a comment. What we are really fostering here is better labeled "Best Procedures." To clarify, procedures are documents, they are published, they are written down and promulgated by an authoritative source such as a company or a regulatory agency, they are dated, they are signed, they can be and almost always are formally modified, updated and changed through a formal process.
As safety advocate, it is my opinion that we should be fostering Best Procedures.
The term practice most often denotes the work of an instructor in teaching students how to carry out a procedure, which the practitioner then uses as a tool for conducting the Standard Operating Procedures correctly, consistently and safely.
The follow-on term is technique. Technique is the individual styles that operators and practitioners employ to make the practice smooth, tailored to the operation and refined.
Best Procedures is what we, I believe, should be advocating. Leave the techniques and practices to the individuals who are the technicians and practitioners.
As safety advocates should we not be about influencing commercial companies and regulatory agencies to set up new authoritative written and published formal methods of operating? Is not our real customer, if you will, is not our real customer each company and regulatory agency? Are not these the parties that we are really trying to address and influence?
Can we expect to address all commercial pilots (70,000 just in the US) with a suggestion on how to adjust their practices? Remember that PRACTICES ARE NOT WRITTEN DOWN. But Procedures are. So this is the difference.
I would encourage us and the rest of the commercial airline industry to consider using the term BEST PROCEDURES from now on and leave the practices to the practitioners and the techniques to the technicians.
Taxonomy is important if we are ever going to be able to communicate.
As safety advocate, it is my opinion that we should be fostering Best Procedures.
The term practice most often denotes the work of an instructor in teaching students how to carry out a procedure, which the practitioner then uses as a tool for conducting the Standard Operating Procedures correctly, consistently and safely.
The follow-on term is technique. Technique is the individual styles that operators and practitioners employ to make the practice smooth, tailored to the operation and refined.
Best Procedures is what we, I believe, should be advocating. Leave the techniques and practices to the individuals who are the technicians and practitioners.
As safety advocates should we not be about influencing commercial companies and regulatory agencies to set up new authoritative written and published formal methods of operating? Is not our real customer, if you will, is not our real customer each company and regulatory agency? Are not these the parties that we are really trying to address and influence?
Can we expect to address all commercial pilots (70,000 just in the US) with a suggestion on how to adjust their practices? Remember that PRACTICES ARE NOT WRITTEN DOWN. But Procedures are. So this is the difference.
I would encourage us and the rest of the commercial airline industry to consider using the term BEST PROCEDURES from now on and leave the practices to the practitioners and the techniques to the technicians.
Taxonomy is important if we are ever going to be able to communicate.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
Bad Math by ICAO?
ICAO may be fostering bad mishap math. ICAO is stating that an increase in mishaps is attributable to an increase in flight operations. If that were so mathematically, than as any airline operated more flights and or flew more hours, their mishap rate would directly increase.
But that is not the case anecdotaly, statistically, case historically or in the experience of this pilot. The author of the ICAO report is looking for the reasons for more mishaps in the wrong place. This is critically important error on the part of ICAO, especially if everyone is trying to achieve the goal of reducing aviation mishaps. ICAO math would have us reducing flight operations in order to reduce the commercial mishap rate.
But is not our goal to solve the mathematical problem of mishaps and rates by finding methods of prevention? To do so, wouldn't you have to know what are the causes of mishaps in the first place?
It is my opinion that aviation mishaps are a direct result of unresolved hazards. The rate of mishap occurrence is therefore reducible by resolving hazards to aviation as quickly as possible. As the factors affecting the rate are reduced through Safety Procedures, the numbers of mishaps will be reduced. That in my opinion is the correct Safety Math.
Accident are therefore a mathematical function of unresolved hazards and are not a mathematical function of hours flown, nor of take-offs or other related operational factors. In my opinion ICAO is using bad math to address the issue of safety hazards and accident rates.
The correct safety math is therefore a function of how quickly we can eliminate hazards. As the rate of hazard occurrence and the actual numbers of hazards are reduced, then the rate of aviation mishaps disasters will be reduced. In fact, it is actually how rapidly we eliminate hazards that also counts, since a hazard over time results in heightened mishaps. Accident Rate is a direct function of unresolved hazards and nothing else.
Even though ICAO is not providing the mathematical or safety leadership needed globally to move commercial aviation safety in the correct and desired direction, it is my hope that many other safety minded managers are, and are doing so by regularly working to quickly resolve hazards to safe flight operations.
Best regards, Paul Miller
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
ICAO Issues Global Safety Report
Aviation accidents around the world ticked higher last year, attributable to the resurgence in air traffic, according to ICAO's inaugural State of Global Aviation Safety Report issued this week.
The number of accidents attributed to scheduled commercial flights increased in 2010 to 121, compared to 113 in 2009, resulting in an accident rate of 4.0 per million departures. The accident rate in 2009 was 3.9 per million departures. While the overall number of fatalities in 2010 was below those in 2005 and 2006, there has been an increase in fatalities over the past three years, ICAO said, increasing from 670 in 2009 to 707 in 2010.
At the same time, the number of scheduled commercial flights increased by 4.5 percent globally since 2009, which represents the first significant annual growth in the sector since 2007 and coincides with an increase of 4.2 percent in the global GDP. North America, which represents a third of global air transport traffic in terms of departures, was the only region to see a small decrease (0.6 percent) in its aggregate traffic figures.
"In the context of this period of renewed growth, and in light of anticipated increases in air travel, it is imperative to maintain a very strong focus on initiatives that will further improve safety outcomes in the future. ICAO is therefore continuously developing and refining more proactive and risk-based methods to further reduce the global accident rate, enabling the safe expansion of air travel in all regions," according to the report.
"ICAO is working in partnership with the international aviation community to achieve continuous reductions in the global accident rate, with an emphasis to improve safety performance in those regions experiencing significantly higher accident rates or having specific safety challenges."
But that is not the case anecdotaly, statistically, case historically or in the experience of this pilot. The author of the ICAO report is looking for the reasons for more mishaps in the wrong place. This is critically important error on the part of ICAO, especially if everyone is trying to achieve the goal of reducing aviation mishaps. ICAO math would have us reducing flight operations in order to reduce the commercial mishap rate.
But is not our goal to solve the mathematical problem of mishaps and rates by finding methods of prevention? To do so, wouldn't you have to know what are the causes of mishaps in the first place?
It is my opinion that aviation mishaps are a direct result of unresolved hazards. The rate of mishap occurrence is therefore reducible by resolving hazards to aviation as quickly as possible. As the factors affecting the rate are reduced through Safety Procedures, the numbers of mishaps will be reduced. That in my opinion is the correct Safety Math.
Accident are therefore a mathematical function of unresolved hazards and are not a mathematical function of hours flown, nor of take-offs or other related operational factors. In my opinion ICAO is using bad math to address the issue of safety hazards and accident rates.
The correct safety math is therefore a function of how quickly we can eliminate hazards. As the rate of hazard occurrence and the actual numbers of hazards are reduced, then the rate of aviation mishaps disasters will be reduced. In fact, it is actually how rapidly we eliminate hazards that also counts, since a hazard over time results in heightened mishaps. Accident Rate is a direct function of unresolved hazards and nothing else.
Even though ICAO is not providing the mathematical or safety leadership needed globally to move commercial aviation safety in the correct and desired direction, it is my hope that many other safety minded managers are, and are doing so by regularly working to quickly resolve hazards to safe flight operations.
Best regards, Paul Miller
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
ICAO Issues Global Safety Report
Aviation accidents around the world ticked higher last year, attributable to the resurgence in air traffic, according to ICAO's inaugural State of Global Aviation Safety Report issued this week.
The number of accidents attributed to scheduled commercial flights increased in 2010 to 121, compared to 113 in 2009, resulting in an accident rate of 4.0 per million departures. The accident rate in 2009 was 3.9 per million departures. While the overall number of fatalities in 2010 was below those in 2005 and 2006, there has been an increase in fatalities over the past three years, ICAO said, increasing from 670 in 2009 to 707 in 2010.
At the same time, the number of scheduled commercial flights increased by 4.5 percent globally since 2009, which represents the first significant annual growth in the sector since 2007 and coincides with an increase of 4.2 percent in the global GDP. North America, which represents a third of global air transport traffic in terms of departures, was the only region to see a small decrease (0.6 percent) in its aggregate traffic figures.
"In the context of this period of renewed growth, and in light of anticipated increases in air travel, it is imperative to maintain a very strong focus on initiatives that will further improve safety outcomes in the future. ICAO is therefore continuously developing and refining more proactive and risk-based methods to further reduce the global accident rate, enabling the safe expansion of air travel in all regions," according to the report.
"ICAO is working in partnership with the international aviation community to achieve continuous reductions in the global accident rate, with an emphasis to improve safety performance in those regions experiencing significantly higher accident rates or having specific safety challenges."
Sunday, December 4, 2011
To my readers from across the globe
Welcome:
If you are a safety manager for a commercial airline, I want to extend a welcome to you. I want to offer my ideas to you to help you make your own airline safer. I know that being a Safety Manager is a very hard job. You either have the choice of doing very little and waiting until a mishap (accident) happens and then you have 2-3 years of mishap investigating to do.
OR
You can work very hard long hours to prevent mishaps from occurring in the first place.
In either case, you will work very hard. The big difference?
In the case of prevention, you will enjoy the holidays with your family, your company will be profitable and all of the employees will enjoy happy careers.
In the case of mishap investigation, you will work so very hard and in the end, realize that all of this pain, suffering, damage and all this waste could have been and should have been prevented and you will have a stack of photographs, a larger stack of papers, a huge smoking hole and a lifetime of regret.
Please follow my blog so that I can give you some ideas on how to be a successful Safety Manager.
All my best regards, Paul Miller
If you would like to send me an email to ask a question or clarify the English language part of all of this, please do.
http://paulmiller@safetyforecast.com and I will answer you individually.
If you are a safety manager for a commercial airline, I want to extend a welcome to you. I want to offer my ideas to you to help you make your own airline safer. I know that being a Safety Manager is a very hard job. You either have the choice of doing very little and waiting until a mishap (accident) happens and then you have 2-3 years of mishap investigating to do.
OR
You can work very hard long hours to prevent mishaps from occurring in the first place.
In either case, you will work very hard. The big difference?
In the case of prevention, you will enjoy the holidays with your family, your company will be profitable and all of the employees will enjoy happy careers.
In the case of mishap investigation, you will work so very hard and in the end, realize that all of this pain, suffering, damage and all this waste could have been and should have been prevented and you will have a stack of photographs, a larger stack of papers, a huge smoking hole and a lifetime of regret.
Please follow my blog so that I can give you some ideas on how to be a successful Safety Manager.
All my best regards, Paul Miller
If you would like to send me an email to ask a question or clarify the English language part of all of this, please do.
http://paulmiller@safetyforecast.com and I will answer you individually.
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