Air Transport Association (ATA), now Airlines for America (A4A)
and the FAA can not claim all of the credit for the huge improvement in
airline safety over the last decade in my opinion. As a matter of fact
and record, both the FAA and ATA now A4A, opposed, and opposed with
great vigor, virtually every safety of flight recommendation from pilot
groups and pilot associations, from individual pilot recommendations
directly to the FAA and/or the employer company, from the NTSB and from
just about every safety foundation, association and organization, not
just in the last decade, but in the rememberable history of this writer.
It has only been after sustained high levels of Washington lobbying,
high profile professional papers delivered, public relations campaigns
and other dedicated efforts to change current regulations, rules and laws that the FAA has agreed to any safety
regulatory or legislative improvements, and on the part of commercial
airline companies, often only after very tough pilot association legal negotiations for
contractual safety improvements.
What are some examples of these safety improvements opposed by the FAA and A4A? Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) for Cargo, Flight Duty and Rest Regulations, Improved Flight Crew Training Requirements, Cockpit Smoke Equipment, improved security, higher ATC standards for aircraft handling and routing around severe convective weather, Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) or Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) at airport equipment, manning requirements and training, hazardous materials air cargo handling and carriage rules, regulations and laws.
Again, these are but a few of the many safety improvements worked for by commercial pilot associations, pilot trade groups, as well as various global flight safety oriented foundations.
Now let's talk ASAP, the Aviation Safety Action Program. A joint commercial pilot committee worked from 1993 to Sept 1995 on the Proposed Draft FAA Advisory Circular for Airline ASAP, the AC being based on the prototype successful program established by American, Allied Pilots Assn and the FAA Southwest Region several years prior. The FAA however sat on this proposed AC, until publishing their own very similar first draft AC in Oct 1998 . The Final ASAP Advisory Circular appeared I believe in 2001. Many airlines then resisted ASAP participation, until finally agreeing and adopting ASAP in the mid 2000's, fully ten years after it was initially recommended by the pilot group.
So I would challenge anything stated about safety by the FAA and A4A in terms of their advocacy and management thereof. In fact the FAA and A4A opposed ASAP and virtually all of these safety programs, that eventually became very valuable programs.
Could it be argued that FAA and A4A are anything but an impediment to airline safety?
Oh, one more important point. All of the safety recommendations made by pilot associations and adopted as regulation, rule or law, have worked!! I would argue that this is why the commercial airline industry is safer today than 10 years ago. That is why we are safer today than ten years ago, not because the FAA and A4A have argued the supposed "Cost and Benefit Analysis" at every safety program proposed.
It is my opinion that lawyers for the FAA and A4A have used "Cost and Benefit Analysis" in some cases to delay safety programs and have not, in so doing, protected the industry from costs. Quite the opposite is true in my opinion. This delay may have actually led to repeated human factors mishaps, of the type being suffered throughout the industry again and again without resolution.
These costs related to commercial aviation disasters have wreaked financial havoc in the commercial airline industry by allowing hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of lives to be wasted, while substituting legal wrangling and administrative procedures to take precedence over safety.
For safety, look to the person with a personal stake in the argument and improvement. Do not look to the supposed argument of "Cost Benefit Analysis" to find any valid and valuable safety programs.
What are some examples of these safety improvements opposed by the FAA and A4A? Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) for Cargo, Flight Duty and Rest Regulations, Improved Flight Crew Training Requirements, Cockpit Smoke Equipment, improved security, higher ATC standards for aircraft handling and routing around severe convective weather, Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) or Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) at airport equipment, manning requirements and training, hazardous materials air cargo handling and carriage rules, regulations and laws.
Again, these are but a few of the many safety improvements worked for by commercial pilot associations, pilot trade groups, as well as various global flight safety oriented foundations.
Now let's talk ASAP, the Aviation Safety Action Program. A joint commercial pilot committee worked from 1993 to Sept 1995 on the Proposed Draft FAA Advisory Circular for Airline ASAP, the AC being based on the prototype successful program established by American, Allied Pilots Assn and the FAA Southwest Region several years prior. The FAA however sat on this proposed AC, until publishing their own very similar first draft AC in Oct 1998 . The Final ASAP Advisory Circular appeared I believe in 2001. Many airlines then resisted ASAP participation, until finally agreeing and adopting ASAP in the mid 2000's, fully ten years after it was initially recommended by the pilot group.
So I would challenge anything stated about safety by the FAA and A4A in terms of their advocacy and management thereof. In fact the FAA and A4A opposed ASAP and virtually all of these safety programs, that eventually became very valuable programs.
Could it be argued that FAA and A4A are anything but an impediment to airline safety?
Oh, one more important point. All of the safety recommendations made by pilot associations and adopted as regulation, rule or law, have worked!! I would argue that this is why the commercial airline industry is safer today than 10 years ago. That is why we are safer today than ten years ago, not because the FAA and A4A have argued the supposed "Cost and Benefit Analysis" at every safety program proposed.
It is my opinion that lawyers for the FAA and A4A have used "Cost and Benefit Analysis" in some cases to delay safety programs and have not, in so doing, protected the industry from costs. Quite the opposite is true in my opinion. This delay may have actually led to repeated human factors mishaps, of the type being suffered throughout the industry again and again without resolution.
These costs related to commercial aviation disasters have wreaked financial havoc in the commercial airline industry by allowing hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of lives to be wasted, while substituting legal wrangling and administrative procedures to take precedence over safety.
For safety, look to the person with a personal stake in the argument and improvement. Do not look to the supposed argument of "Cost Benefit Analysis" to find any valid and valuable safety programs.
