What is the next big thing to hit my airline? How would I know? Is there a way to know ahead of time what will happen next?
Yes, there is!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
And it is all about using Safety Forecasting. Contact Paul Miller and Dave Williams here to ask how we can help you stay ahead of the next big thing!
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Can Improved Training Lead to Improved Safety?
Can Commercial Airlines Achieve ‘One Level Of Safety’
By Embarking on a Program of ‘One Level of Training’:
What is the Relationship Between
Training and Safety in Commercial Air Operations?
By Captain Paul Miller and Captain David Williams
The paper looks at the relationship between training and safety at commercial airlines with a high level of training and finds several important aspects. First the paper finds that the training program and the safety program are integrated. In other words, safety program data feeds directly into the training program. The training program has numerous mechanisms prepared to use what is being developed, discovered and reported in the safety program
Secondly, the paper finds that the level of training is related to the level of safety. In other words, as safety risks are evaluated by the safety program manager, risks both experienced and expected, the risks and their resolutions are integrated into training at that equivalent level of importance and emphasis. The response of the safety manager to systemic as well as individual and specific risks, results in a further response by the training manager in flight crew education, in the updating and flow of safety data, in standard operating procedures, practices and techniques, and finally in simulator and academic training syllabi. This results in training at a level much higher than the minimum required by regulation. The airline addresses training requirements of the regulator but also establishes a current and valid list of safety concerns that then can become additional curricula requirements of the airline's training sayllabus.
Thirdly, the paper finds looks at methods that training and safety departments use to integrate training and safety, programs and develop training at a level much higher than the minimum required by regulation.
The paper next examines National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accident Reports for commercial airlines and finds numerous references to flight crewmember training deficiencies or shortfalls. The paper then offers the postulation that the achievement of safe commercial airline operations may be related to the integration of a safety program with the training program.
The paper next looks at the relationship between training and safety at commercial airlines which subscribe to minimal training requirements and determines the differences in the process of integration between the training and safety programs, from those observed at airlines that integrate safety data into training and train at a higher level. A correlation is suggested between the achievement of safe operations and training by the NTSB reports.
Lastly the paper examines the question, “If you are seeking one level of safety amongst all commercial airline operations, would you not also need to seek one level of training amongst all commercial airline operations?” This is not to ask or suggest that all training syllabi be identical, but it is to ask the question, “Would all training at least have to be of the same level, that is at a level equivalent with the risks experienced and expected?” The paper looks at ways to measure training levels of proficiency, substance and sophistication. The measurement is then used to compare training in this way at a minimum level with training at a higher level and evaluate the differences.
The paper concludes with the postulation that the FAA policy of One Level of Safety may become achievable when the industry embarks on a policy of One Level of Training. The paper seeks to examine if this One Level of Safety through One Level of Training is possible and if so, what are some of the important details of such an effort?
[The paper would be of interest to commercial air operators, and in specific persons involved in safety management and flight training. It would be of specific interest to organizations that are tasked with regulation of and promotion of the commercial airline industry as well as manufacturers of aircraft and those offering training products and services.]
CV: Captain Paul Miller is currently an international captain with a major global commercial airline. In pursuing the goal of flight operations with zero mishaps, he has served on the pilot association safety committee and on the joint safety forum of the association and the airline. He helped to compose the first rough draft of the FAA Advisory Circular on the joint FAA, airline and pilot association aviation safety action partnership. He served as a safety program manager previously in the US Navy managing safety at two major air installations and a carrier based passenger and logistics squadron. He serves on the European Advisory Committee, Flight Safety Foundation. He has presented papers on safety program management, safety forecasting and planning and response based safety programs. He holds a degree in engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a minor degree in Humanities from Saint Leo University and is attending The College of William and Mary, Masters of Business Administration program.
CV: Captain David Williams served as an FAA designated check airman at a regional airline and as a line and training captain. He served as an aircraft mishap board member and as a pilot association safety representative. A US Navy career veteran from the maritime and antisubmarine patrol community, he served in numerous capacities in training, flight instruction and standards, including as a fleet pilot evaluator and check airman. His goals have always been to train to the particular characteristics of each individual so that the pilot group as a whole is standardized and competent. He holds a degree in science. Now retired, Captain Williams remains active in safety and training consulting.
By Embarking on a Program of ‘One Level of Training’:
What is the Relationship Between
Training and Safety in Commercial Air Operations?
By Captain Paul Miller and Captain David Williams
The paper looks at the relationship between training and safety at commercial airlines with a high level of training and finds several important aspects. First the paper finds that the training program and the safety program are integrated. In other words, safety program data feeds directly into the training program. The training program has numerous mechanisms prepared to use what is being developed, discovered and reported in the safety program
Secondly, the paper finds that the level of training is related to the level of safety. In other words, as safety risks are evaluated by the safety program manager, risks both experienced and expected, the risks and their resolutions are integrated into training at that equivalent level of importance and emphasis. The response of the safety manager to systemic as well as individual and specific risks, results in a further response by the training manager in flight crew education, in the updating and flow of safety data, in standard operating procedures, practices and techniques, and finally in simulator and academic training syllabi. This results in training at a level much higher than the minimum required by regulation. The airline addresses training requirements of the regulator but also establishes a current and valid list of safety concerns that then can become additional curricula requirements of the airline's training sayllabus.
Thirdly, the paper finds looks at methods that training and safety departments use to integrate training and safety, programs and develop training at a level much higher than the minimum required by regulation.
The paper next examines National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accident Reports for commercial airlines and finds numerous references to flight crewmember training deficiencies or shortfalls. The paper then offers the postulation that the achievement of safe commercial airline operations may be related to the integration of a safety program with the training program.
The paper next looks at the relationship between training and safety at commercial airlines which subscribe to minimal training requirements and determines the differences in the process of integration between the training and safety programs, from those observed at airlines that integrate safety data into training and train at a higher level. A correlation is suggested between the achievement of safe operations and training by the NTSB reports.
Lastly the paper examines the question, “If you are seeking one level of safety amongst all commercial airline operations, would you not also need to seek one level of training amongst all commercial airline operations?” This is not to ask or suggest that all training syllabi be identical, but it is to ask the question, “Would all training at least have to be of the same level, that is at a level equivalent with the risks experienced and expected?” The paper looks at ways to measure training levels of proficiency, substance and sophistication. The measurement is then used to compare training in this way at a minimum level with training at a higher level and evaluate the differences.
The paper concludes with the postulation that the FAA policy of One Level of Safety may become achievable when the industry embarks on a policy of One Level of Training. The paper seeks to examine if this One Level of Safety through One Level of Training is possible and if so, what are some of the important details of such an effort?
[The paper would be of interest to commercial air operators, and in specific persons involved in safety management and flight training. It would be of specific interest to organizations that are tasked with regulation of and promotion of the commercial airline industry as well as manufacturers of aircraft and those offering training products and services.]
CV: Captain Paul Miller is currently an international captain with a major global commercial airline. In pursuing the goal of flight operations with zero mishaps, he has served on the pilot association safety committee and on the joint safety forum of the association and the airline. He helped to compose the first rough draft of the FAA Advisory Circular on the joint FAA, airline and pilot association aviation safety action partnership. He served as a safety program manager previously in the US Navy managing safety at two major air installations and a carrier based passenger and logistics squadron. He serves on the European Advisory Committee, Flight Safety Foundation. He has presented papers on safety program management, safety forecasting and planning and response based safety programs. He holds a degree in engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a minor degree in Humanities from Saint Leo University and is attending The College of William and Mary, Masters of Business Administration program.
CV: Captain David Williams served as an FAA designated check airman at a regional airline and as a line and training captain. He served as an aircraft mishap board member and as a pilot association safety representative. A US Navy career veteran from the maritime and antisubmarine patrol community, he served in numerous capacities in training, flight instruction and standards, including as a fleet pilot evaluator and check airman. His goals have always been to train to the particular characteristics of each individual so that the pilot group as a whole is standardized and competent. He holds a degree in science. Now retired, Captain Williams remains active in safety and training consulting.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
Safety is Local
Why is being local an important aspect of any safety program?
The answer is quite simple: the owner of an asset has the most vested interest in preserving the assets by a safety program. Government and other organizations do have safety programs and they are important to aviation, especially commercial aviation. But the local program has the ability to address every threat to the preservation of assets, even those which might not initially alarm or get the attention of a government program.
Here is an example: Several years ago, the FAA and the City of Sacramento opened a previously closed former military airfield as an additional city airport. The airport was not crowded, but late night noise was an issue for the main airport neighbors. So air express cargo and package airlines were moved to the new field.
But neither the FAA nor the companies were alarmed by the airfield being put into operation without an air traffic control towner, without a crash fire and rescue crew and equipment, and without approach lighting and radar.
The pilot association was alarmed and raised the safety concern locally at the company, the city and the FAA. It was the local concern expressed by the pilot group which led the FAA, the city and the company to install a working tower, crash crew, approach lighting and radar.
Local input in safety programs is critical to safety. The upshot is that the company has suffered no aviation mishaps, in what initially was a high risk operation.
The answer is quite simple: the owner of an asset has the most vested interest in preserving the assets by a safety program. Government and other organizations do have safety programs and they are important to aviation, especially commercial aviation. But the local program has the ability to address every threat to the preservation of assets, even those which might not initially alarm or get the attention of a government program.
Here is an example: Several years ago, the FAA and the City of Sacramento opened a previously closed former military airfield as an additional city airport. The airport was not crowded, but late night noise was an issue for the main airport neighbors. So air express cargo and package airlines were moved to the new field.
But neither the FAA nor the companies were alarmed by the airfield being put into operation without an air traffic control towner, without a crash fire and rescue crew and equipment, and without approach lighting and radar.
The pilot association was alarmed and raised the safety concern locally at the company, the city and the FAA. It was the local concern expressed by the pilot group which led the FAA, the city and the company to install a working tower, crash crew, approach lighting and radar.
Local input in safety programs is critical to safety. The upshot is that the company has suffered no aviation mishaps, in what initially was a high risk operation.
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
Expensive Investigation? Better Operating Alternatives?
What are the costs now being incurred by Brazil, France, Air France, Airbus and all other parties to the AF447 disaster? Ever thought of that? My estimation is that more than $500 million will be spent in the next 2-3 years in operations related to this mishap.
I wonder what would be the costs for Air France and other airlines of keeping the requested and cleared flight paths for scheduled flights clear of areas of massive convective thunderstorms, by using real time satellite photos, dispatch reroutes and various satellite and HF communications? By the way all of the technology is on board the airplane and in flight control dispatch offices.
I wonder what would be the costs for Air France and other airlines of keeping the requested and cleared flight paths for scheduled flights clear of areas of massive convective thunderstorms, by using real time satellite photos, dispatch reroutes and various satellite and HF communications? By the way all of the technology is on board the airplane and in flight control dispatch offices.
Saturday, May 16, 2009
Safety Riddle
Safety Riddle: Does the mishap cause the hazard to occur or does the hazard cause the mishap to occur?
According to the FAA, Congress and airline transport associations safety experts, every thing is fine, until every thing is not fine. Read this case below:
Crash Puts Focus on Air Safety-Senate Panel Plans Further Hearings (Washington Post, May 15)
A U.S. Senate committee is planning to hold a series of hearings next month looking into the safety practices of commercial airlines, following revelations of a number of safety lapses from the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407.
The announcement came on the final day of public hearings by the NTSB into the Feb. 12 crash near, which killed 50 people. The crash was the first fatal commercial aviation accident in two years and has been described by the NTSB as the worst transportation accident in seven years.
In an interview yesterday, Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), chairman of the Senate subcommittee that oversees aviation, said he was "stunned by what I've seen and heard on the evidence" from the safety board hearings.
"There are issues of training, crew rest, exam failures, acquaintance with icing," Dorgan said.
"There are so many things that are troublesome. It calls for a real serious investigation."
Dorgan said he met yesterday with families of victims of Flight 3407. He said his committee's hearings will examine the safety practices of the regional airline industry, which has grown as major airlines contract out service to smaller cities. Colgan Air, which is the Manassas-based unit of Pinnacle Airlines, was operating theBuffalo
My question is this. Didn't the safety hazard issues exist before the crash occurred? Why is Congress, FAA and other safety experts looking at these issues after the crash occurred? Why didn't they look at them before the crash occurred?
Do they believe that the crash caused the hazards to occur? Is that why they are looking at them now? But in contrast, wouldn't the average person believe that the hazards were there all along, waiting for a challenging situation to bring them out? Any pilot can fly on a fair day. But does it not take a well trained pilot to fly on a dark and stormy night?
Would you agree that the hazard occurred before the mishap and in fact was directly related to the cause of the mishap?
So what is Congress doing? Here is the answer. Congress are lawyers. In tort law, you have to have an offense before you can go to court. You have hearings also before you go to court, to determine if a court proceeding is justified. So these hearing and the Congressional action is related to finding blame for the damage done. That is why the hearings are taking place after the mishap occurred, That is what lawyers do. They take injured parties to court and try to get recompense from the parties that injured them. That is what is going on here.
This is not safety.It is too late to practice safety when the mishap has already occurred. This is just tort law proceedings under the guise of Congressional hearings. The goal may be legislation, but to do what: To make the FAA live up to their own policy of "ONE LEVEL OF SAFETY"?
According to the FAA, Congress and airline transport associations safety experts, every thing is fine, until every thing is not fine. Read this case below:
Crash Puts Focus on Air Safety-Senate Panel Plans Further Hearings (Washington Post, May 15)
A U.S. Senate committee is planning to hold a series of hearings next month looking into the safety practices of commercial airlines, following revelations of a number of safety lapses from the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407.
The announcement came on the final day of public hearings by the NTSB into the Feb. 12 crash near, which killed 50 people. The crash was the first fatal commercial aviation accident in two years and has been described by the NTSB as the worst transportation accident in seven years.
In an interview yesterday, Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), chairman of the Senate subcommittee that oversees aviation, said he was "stunned by what I've seen and heard on the evidence" from the safety board hearings.
"There are issues of training, crew rest, exam failures, acquaintance with icing," Dorgan said.
"There are so many things that are troublesome. It calls for a real serious investigation."
Dorgan said he met yesterday with families of victims of Flight 3407. He said his committee's hearings will examine the safety practices of the regional airline industry, which has grown as major airlines contract out service to smaller cities. Colgan Air, which is the Manassas-based unit of Pinnacle Airlines, was operating the
My question is this. Didn't the safety hazard issues exist before the crash occurred? Why is Congress, FAA and other safety experts looking at these issues after the crash occurred? Why didn't they look at them before the crash occurred?
Do they believe that the crash caused the hazards to occur? Is that why they are looking at them now? But in contrast, wouldn't the average person believe that the hazards were there all along, waiting for a challenging situation to bring them out? Any pilot can fly on a fair day. But does it not take a well trained pilot to fly on a dark and stormy night?
Would you agree that the hazard occurred before the mishap and in fact was directly related to the cause of the mishap?
So what is Congress doing? Here is the answer. Congress are lawyers. In tort law, you have to have an offense before you can go to court. You have hearings also before you go to court, to determine if a court proceeding is justified. So these hearing and the Congressional action is related to finding blame for the damage done. That is why the hearings are taking place after the mishap occurred, That is what lawyers do. They take injured parties to court and try to get recompense from the parties that injured them. That is what is going on here.
This is not safety.It is too late to practice safety when the mishap has already occurred. This is just tort law proceedings under the guise of Congressional hearings. The goal may be legislation, but to do what: To make the FAA live up to their own policy of "ONE LEVEL OF SAFETY"?
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
A Continuing Conversation
How can aviation safety be viewed as a continuing conversation, and not just get media attention after a crash or near miss?
Leeanna Pletcher
Leeanna Pletcher
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)